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The ﬁscal theory of the price level has recently received important attention as an alternative
theory of price determination. Empirical tests of the FTPL have been rare, and have undergone
forceful criticism by Cochrane [Cochrane, J., 1998. A frictionless view of US inﬂation. NBER
Macroeconomics Annual. MIT Press, pp. 323–384] based on ‘‘observational equivalence’’ arguments.
This paper proposes two extensions to the empirics of the FTPL. First, we apply the methodology
initiated by Canzoneri et al. [Canzoneri, M.B., Cumby, R.E., Diba, B.T., 2001. Is the price level
determined by the needs of ﬁscal solvency? American Economic Review 91, 1221–1238] to European
data. Second, we use structural balance data, in order to overcome Cochrane’s critique. Our
conclusion is that for neither country the data support a FTPL interpretation.
 2006 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
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Recent emphasis on inﬂation targets and monetary policy rules has given considerable
weight to central banks as regards inﬂation determination. Meanwhile, central bank inde-
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J. Creel, H. Le Bihan / Journal of Macroeconomics 28 (2006) 338–360 339policies. These developments have been rationalized in the context of the new standard
monetary policy paradigm, building, as Woodford (2001) argues, on a mix of the following
arguments. First, ﬁscal policy should have no inﬂuence on the long-run inﬂation rate. Fis-
cal policy may at worst fuel inﬂation via the future expected monetization of debts (Sar-
gent and Wallace, 1981). Second, Ricardian equivalence should wipe out the real eﬀects of
an active ﬁscal policy. Third, owing to seigniorage being negligible in most developed
countries, central bank independence should not be costly to governments.
The emergence of the ﬁscal theory of the price level (hereafter, FTPL) has however chal-
lenged this view. The FTPL indeed provides a theoretical determination of the price level
with strong emphasis on the links between monetary and ﬁscal policies (Leeper, 1991), in
both purely ﬂexible and sticky prices frameworks (Woodford, 1995, 1996) and without
resorting to seigniorage or monetization arguments. The FTPL links price determination
to the government present value budget constraint, i.e. the equality of the public debt with
the present discounted value of future expected primary surpluses. The key intuition of the
FTPL is that, if current and future ﬁscal policies are set without concern for sustainability,
the general price level will ‘‘jump’’ in order to fulﬁll the present value budget constraint.
Though the theoretical issues raised by the FTPL are crucial, there have been few
attempts to test this theory on empirical grounds so far. A notable exception is Canzoneri
et al. (2001) [CCD hereafter], who use a VAR approach to assess the FTPL. They consider
that, under a FTPL regime, positive shocks to primary surpluses should raise the public
debt to GDP ratio. With US data, CCD show however that positive shocks to the primary
surplus provoke a fall in the public debt to GDP ratio, which they hence interpret as a
rejection of the FTPL. Their methodology was quite severely criticized by Cochrane
(1998). He argued that their results may be fully consistent with the prevalence of a FTPL
regime, usually called a ‘‘non-Ricardian’’ regime.1 Basing upon the distinction between the
cyclical and structural (or cyclically adjusted) components of the primary surplus, Coch-
rane provides a theoretical set-up in which impulse response functions of the form given in
CCD do arise, even though the FTPL prevails. The mechanism operates through a nega-
tive correlation between the innovations of the components of the primary surplus.
Although CCD acknowledged Cochrane’s critique, they performed only a limited investi-
gation on this point.
The present paper proposes two extensions to the empirics of the FTPL. First, we apply
CCD (2001)’s methodology to the case of the major Euro-area countries (France, Ger-
many, Italy) and the UK. Analyzing the plausibility of a Ricardian regime for individual
countries of the Euro area is particularly relevant, since it conditions the ability of the
European Central Bank to achieve price stability (see Leeper, 1991 for a theoretical ana-
lysis, and Woodford, 1996, for an application to the Euro area). The European Stability
and Growth Pact (SGP), enacted in 1997, cannot indeed be assumed to ensure a Ricardian
regime.2 The case of the UK is also worth being investigated. First, the UK has1 Conversely, a non-FTPL regime is called a Ricardian regime. Governments are labelled ‘‘Ricardian’’ when
they implement policies which are set in accordance with the fulﬁllment of their present value budget constraint.
The terminology on ‘‘Ricardian vs. non-Ricardian’’ governments originates in Aiyagari and Gertler (1985).
2 First, several Euro-area countries have failed to abide by the 3% of GDP ceiling on public deﬁcit in recent
years (Portugal, France, Germany, the Netherlands and Italy). Moreover, it is not clear that the SGP embodies a
Ricardian ﬁscal regime: for instance, bounded public deﬁcits are a pre-requisite for price stability in a ‘‘non-
Ricardian’’ ﬁscal regime; in a ‘‘Ricardian’’ regime, the key element is the feedback behavior leading to the
stabilization of public debt rather than that of the public deﬁcit.
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impinged on the choice of its ﬁscal regime. Second, the possible prevalence of a ‘‘non-
Ricardian’’ regime in this country would have strong implications with respect to his pos-
sible entry in the EMU. We also report empirical benchmark results for the USA.
Our second extension consists in incorporating structural balance data into the analysis
in order to gain some immunity with respect to Cochrane’s critique. We investigate
whether, assuming a FTPL regime, the joint structural and cyclical deﬁcit processes are
able to produce empirical impulse response functions (IRFs) that would lead to ‘‘apparent
rejection’’ of the FTPL. In particular, we extend the scope for Cochrane’s argument by
allowing for lagged, rather than contemporary, cross-correlations between both compo-
nents of the primary surplus.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews the macroeconomic
implications of the FTPL and the diﬀerent empirical tests which have been used so far
and have invalidated the theory. The controversy between CCD and Cochrane is dis-
cussed. The data and methodology used in the paper are presented in Section 3. Section
4 is devoted to empirical results. The main ﬁndings are twofold: ﬁrst, using the methodol-
ogy of CCD, the FTPL must be rejected in the case of all ﬁve countries under study; sec-
ond, including structural ﬁscal data to account for Cochrane’s insights does not provide
support to a FTPL interpretation of the data for France, Germany, Italy and the US.
The UK case presents speciﬁc results which cannot however fully support the FTPL.
2. Testing the FTPL
2.1. The FTPL: An overview
The FTPL states that the government can exogenously set its real spending and revenue
plans, and that the price level will take on the value required to adjust the real value of its
contractual nominal debt obligations to ensure government solvency. This theory hence
emphasizes that the price level is able to ‘‘jump’’ in relation to the government present
value budget constraint and that governments can be labelled ‘‘non-Ricardian’’. Unlike
the process developed by Sargent and Wallace (1981), the mechanism underlying the
FTPL, while directly linked to the present value budget constraint, does not either hinge
on the variation of the monetary aggregates or on the monetization of public debt.3
Consider the government ﬂow budget identity:
Btþ1 ¼ ð1þ itÞBt  Stþ1; ð1Þ
where Bt is public debt at the end of period t, it is the return on public debt, St is the net
(primary) surplus.
This constraint can be formulated in terms of GDP shares as
btþ1 ¼ rtbt  stþ1; ð2Þ
where bt ¼ Btptyt, st ¼
St
ptyt
and rt ¼ ð1þ itÞ ptytptþ1ytþ1, with pt the price level and yt real GDP. Thus,
(rt  1) is approximately equal to the real interest rate less the economic growth rate. For3 The question of the role of ﬁat money in the FTPL is discussed more in depth in Appendix A in order to
justify our choice of ‘‘public liabilities’’ data.
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Etrt+j = r for all j > 0).
The ﬂow condition can be solved forward to yield the present value budget
constraint:
bt ¼
Xk
j¼1
1
rj
Etstþj þ 1rk EtðbtþkÞ. ð3Þ
Eq. (3) is an accounting identity. Stated ex post, it should hold for whatever value of the
interest rate, the primary surplus or nominal income. Now, government solvency is en-
sured if the last term on the RHS of Eq. (3) tends to zero when k tends to the inﬁnity. This
transversality condition ensures that the public debt to GDP ratio does not increase by
more than the gap between the interest rate and the GDP growth rate. The familiar sus-
tainability condition for public ﬁnances is
bt ¼
X1
j¼1
1
rj
Etstþj. ð4Þ
The main outcome of the FTPL is in stating that there are two diﬀerent ex ante mech-
anisms which enable the equality between both sides of Eq. (4). In the ﬁrst case, the ﬁscal
authority adjusts its future spending and taxes so that they meet the constraint for what-
ever value of the interest rate and the nominal income. The ﬁscal authority is called
‘‘Ricardian’’.
In the second case, hereafter referred to as the ‘‘non-Ricardian’’ case, the ﬁscal
authority does not act in accordance with the fulﬁllment of its budget constraint, so that
pt must adjust to ensure equilibrium. For instance, at time 0, if future primary surpluses
are set exogenously, and both initial nominal debt and real GDP are pre-determined,
the general price level is set so as to satisfy the present value budget constraint according
to:4
p0 ¼
B0
y0
X1
j¼1
1
rj
E0sj
" #1
. ð5Þ
Hence, other things equal, the higher future public primary deﬁcits, the higher the initial
price level.
Needless to say, the FTPL poses a considerable challenge to existing theories of price
level determination. The FTPL is a theory of the ‘‘jumping general price level’’ which sub-
stitutes the quantity theory of money with a quantity theory of the Public Debt (Wood-
ford, 1995). That ﬁnancial innovations have largely challenged the foundations of the
quantity theory of money provides some support to the above-mentioned ‘‘substitution’’.
Indeed, the transaction demand for money is very diﬃcult to delimit, and central banks
may not perfectly control a deﬁnite monetary aggregate. Alternatively, if central banks
set short-run nominal interest rate according to a feedback rule, the FTPL still places
strong restrictions on monetary policy behavior. Indeed, the determination of the price
level depends on the interactions between monetary and ﬁscal policies. Two stable regimes4 A third solution would consist for the government in selling additional long-term debt, with no change in
future surpluses. This would devalue outstanding long-term debt and raise future inﬂation (Cochrane, 2001).
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meet Eq. (4), ﬁscal policy is ‘passive’, and the economy is on a stable path if and only if
monetary policy is ‘active’, i.e. the short-run nominal interest rate over-reacts to deviations
of the inﬂation rate from its target. Second, if the government does not adjust its future
surpluses to fulﬁll Eq. (4), ﬁscal policy is ‘active’. A locally stable path for the economy
then requires the implementation of a ‘passive’ monetary policy, i.e. a reduction in the real
interest rate after a positive deviation of the inﬂation rate from its target; this fall conse-
quently curbs public debt growth. Only this latter regime can be consistent with the FTPL.
These two (locally-)stable regimes are at the heart of an empirical controversy between
Cochrane (1998) and Canzoneri et al. (2001). Cochrane showed that the VAR analyses of
the latter authors, which provide ‘‘apparent evidence’’ of a negative short-run correlation
between debt and surpluses (a ‘Ricardian’ regime), may in fact hide a positive relationship
if some assumptions are veriﬁed. The resulting ‘‘observational equivalence’’ notably
applies under some conditions which are discussed below.
2.2. Fiscal policy and the FTPL: The empirical controversy
Most relevant empirical tests of the FTPL rely on analyses of the relationships between
ﬁscal variables only. Alternative approaches indeed seem to be less suited. First, though a
straightforward idea could have been to perform a ‘‘direct’’ test using the price level as a
LHS variable and to assess whether an equation like (5) holds, this approach, to our
knowledge, has never been implemented. It would surely face the objection that the
above-mentioned equation relies on the joint hypothesis of the FTPL and fully ﬂexible
prices.5 Second, as suggested by Woodford (1998), estimating monetary rules should
reveal whether central banks’ behavior is consistent with the FTPL. Indeed, Leeper’s char-
acterization of a ‘passive’ monetary rule, consistent with a FTPL regime, is that the inﬂa-
tion coeﬃcient in the interest rate rule is inferior to unity, thus violating the ‘‘Taylor
principle’’ which states the coeﬃcient should be superior to unity. Evidence provided by
Clarida et al. (1998) suggests that the ‘‘Taylor principle’’ has been empirically observed
in most industrial countries, ruling out the FTPL. However, this type of evidence is not
deﬁnitive for at least two reasons. First, it is not robust to the time span (Clarida et al.,
2000) or to the estimation methodology (Woodford, 1998). Second, even if monetary pol-
icy were ‘active’, ﬁscal policy might still be ‘active’ and the economic regime would be
(locally-)unstable. In such a situation, ﬁscal behavior would still clearly inﬂuence the price
level, though in a destabilizing way.
The above-mentioned arguments suggest to speciﬁcally investigate ﬁscal behavior. Lee-
per (1991) and CCD showed that a ‘‘Ricardian’’ regime is obtained provided the primary
surplus responds positively to debt. This condition is fulﬁlled if the ﬁscal authority follows
a feedback rule like:
st ¼ abt1 þ et. ð6Þ5 Canzoneri and Diba (2003), Leith and Wren-Lewis (2000) and Woodford (1996) showed that the FTPL could
be consistent with sticky prices. In this case, Eq. (4) would determine nominal GDP in the ‘‘non-Ricardian’’
regime; price rigidity hence aﬀects how changes in nominal GDP materialize, either via (slow) price changes or via
real GDP changes. As the above-mentioned equation cannot testify for the existence of sticky prices, a direct test
may prove irrelevant.
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hence that the regime is ‘‘Ricardian’’. Consequently, empirical evidence on ﬁscal feedback
rules, e.g. Bohn (1998), have been interpreted as a rejection of the ‘‘non-Ricardian’’
regime.
Cochrane (1998, pp. 340–341) forcefully criticized this interpretation, stating that the
FTPL can be subject to an ‘‘observational equivalence’’ phenomenon. Cochrane’s argu-
ment stems from the fact that an equation like (6) may hold as an equilibrium condition
even in a ‘‘non-Ricardian’’ setting and that it thus cannot provide conclusive evidence on
the existence of a ‘‘Ricardian’’ regime.
Consider an exogenous autoregressive process for the surplus, which embodies a typical
‘‘non-Ricardian’’ behavior:
st ¼ qst1 þ vt ð7Þ
with 0 < q < 1 and vt is i.i.d. In a ‘‘non-Ricardian’’ regime, provided the ex ante real inter-
est rate is constant, the price level at time t  1 will follow:
pt1 ¼ ðBt1=yt1Þ 
Xk
j¼1
1
r
 j
Et1st1þj
 !1
.
Since Et1st1+j = q
j1Et1st, the following equality will hold:
st ¼ bt1  ðr  qÞ  vt. ð8Þ
Quite obviously, the latter equilibrium condition cannot be distinguished from a
‘‘Ricardian’’ feedback rule (6).
The VAR approach introduced by CCD was an attempt to overcome this ‘‘observa-
tional equivalence’’ problem. The approach relies on the dynamic properties of the joint
debt-surplus process rather than on a single equation like (6). CCD observed that in a
FTPL regime, the real value of debt should increase following a rise in surplus, at least
if the surplus series present some positive autocorrelation. They estimated a bivariate
VAR model using the surplus and debt series, and then studied the properties of the
impulse response functions (IRFs). They found that after a positive surplus shock, the real
value of debt decreases. They ﬁnally concluded in favour of a ‘‘Ricardian’’ regime and
rejected the FTPL.
However, Cochrane (1998, pp. 368–370) argued that an ‘‘observational equivalence’’
issue applied as well in the VAR approach developed in CCD. He proposed the following
example. Suppose that the observed surplus is the sum of two components, a cyclical com-
ponent (at) and a structural (or cyclically adjusted) component (zt) that respectively follow
AR processes:
at ¼ gaat1 þ eat; ð9Þ
zt ¼ gzzt1 þ ezt; ð10Þ
st ¼ zt þ at. ð11Þ
Also assume that the structural balance component is more persistent than the
cyclical component, and that the economy is in a FTPL regime so that real debt is
given by bt ¼
P1
j¼1b
jstþj, where b ¼ 1r. Solving this forward-looking discounted sum
yields:
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1 bga
at þ bgz
1 bgz
zt. ð12Þ
Using vector notations Yt = (st,bt)
0 and Xt = (at,zt) 0, Eqs. (9)–(12) can be put together
into a state-space system:
X t ¼ AX t1 þ et;
Y t ¼ MX t;
where
A ¼ ga 0
0 gz
 
; et ¼
eat
ezt
 
and M ¼
1 1
bga
1 bga
bgz
1 bgz
2
4
3
5.
An implied VAR representation for vector Yt = (st,bt)
0 is then:
Y t ¼ MAM1Y t1 þ ut ð13Þ
with ut =Met. As a consequence, the covariance matrix of ut is X =MRM 0, where
R ¼ Eðete0tÞ ¼ r
2
a qazrarz
qazrarz r
2
z
 
.
If the innovations in the two components of the primary surplus are negatively corre-
lated (i.e., E(eatezt) = qazrarz < 0), it is straightforward to show that the innovations in the
debt-surplus process (st,bt) can also be negatively correlated, thus producing the ‘‘appear-
ance’’ of a ‘‘Ricardian’’ regime although a ‘‘non-Ricardian’’ regime was assumed to
prevail.
The rationale for the negative correlation can be set out as follows: after a decrease in
the cyclical component of the primary surplus, the government may tend to increase the
structural component. As the persistence of the latter variable has been assumed to be
high, in ﬁne, real debt increases because the expected present value of total surplus has
increased. In such a case, a positive shock on the surplus (a shock on u1t originating in
a shock on eat) causes the real debt to decrease, a situation which CCD considered suﬃ-
cient to reject the ‘‘non-Ricardian’’ regime. Finally, one can observe simultaneously, on
the one hand, a negative correlation between surplus and real debt following a ﬁscal shock
(i.e., a ‘‘Ricardian’’ IRF) and, on the other hand, an equality between real debt and the
sequence of future discounted surpluses (i.e., a ‘‘non-Ricardian’’ regime).
Cochrane’s two-step critique thus suggests that the methodology used by CCD should
be supplemented by including the cyclical and structural components of the primary sur-
plus within the VAR.
3. Our empirical approach
Our empirical approach has two steps: ﬁrst, a bivariate debt-surplus VAR model in the
spirit of CCD is estimated for each country under study. Second, structural balance data
are introduced in order to cope with Cochrane’s ‘‘observational equivalence’’ argument.
Data description is provided in Appendix A. Data are presented in Fig. 1 while Table 1
provides some summary statistics.
The FTPL implies that high public debt to GDP ratios should result from high future
discounted primary surpluses. High public deﬁcits (which raise nominal debt) should
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Fig. 1. The data. Note: The following series, expressed as a percentage of GDP, are plotted: overall surplus (S),
primary surplus (SP), debt (DD), cyclical surplus (SC) and primary structural surplus (SSP).
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Fig. 1 (continued)
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looking at time series, it is diﬃcult to distinguish between both options and to assess
the plausibility of a non-Ricardian regime for a given country.
In the USA, for instance, although public deﬁcits tended to increase in the 1960–1970s,
the net public debt to GDP ratio decreased substantially until the mid-1970s. A similar
evolution can be found for the UK net public debt. Such an evolution might just reﬂect
a period of high inﬂation, and negative real interest rates with mainly non-indexed debt,
but it might also be consistent with a FTPL regime. Moreover, the US and UK public
deﬁcits on GDP ratios have largely swung, with a positive trend until the 1980s in the case
of the USA. Every 4–5 years, US public surpluses nonetheless reemerged after the deﬁcit
had reached a peak: in 1959, 1968, 1976, and 1983. Most of these peaks were due to exter-
nal shocks: wars (Korea, Vietnam) or soaring oil prices. These swungs in public deﬁcits
and the on-going rise in the public debt to GDP ratio since 1974 might also be consistent
with a FTPL regime: increases in the deﬁcits have possibly given rise to higher debt
Table 1
Summary statistics
Sample
mean
Standard
deviation
Min Max ADF
t-statistics
L SP
t-statistics
KPSS
The US
Primary surplus 0.18 1.63 3.43 3.88 1.56 1 2.09 0.239
Debt 35.57 8.37 23.86 49.49 1.67 1 1.10 0.562(a)
Overall surplus 2.41 1.83 6.04 1.36 1.67 1 1.77 0.282
Primary structural surplus 0.49 1.11 2.06 2.50 2.47 1 3.04a 0.284
Cyclical surplus 0.67 1.21 3.08 1.38 2.00 1 1.93 0.197
Germany
Primary surplus 0.57 1.53 5.91 2.24 1.66 2 3.23a 0.502(a)
Debt 9.34 19.05 15.27 45.36 0.32 4 2.29 0.996(a)
Overall surplus 1.41 1.82 5.46 2.96 2.48 2 3.33a 0.513(a)
Primary structural surplus 0.54 1.91 4.70 2.28 1.51 1 2.40 0.557(a)
Cyclical surplus 0.02 0.98 1.77 1.89 3.43a 1 2.80a 0.292
France
Primary surplus 0.25 1.06 2.38 2.13 2.75a 1 2.53 0.322
Debt 10.65 14.85 3.35 43.20 1.04 1 1.39 0.845(a)
Overall surplus 1.84 1.84 6.00 0.93 1.82 1 2.05 0.760(a)
Primary structural surplus 0.46 0.90 1.42 2.07 2.72a 1 2.72 0.157
Cyclical surplus 0.21 0.57 1.05 1.06 2.85a 1 2.49 0.337
Italy
Primary surplus 2.46 3.79 9.90 6.05 0.47 3 1.68 0.549(a)
Debt 67.13 28.39 24.95 110.75 0.76 1 2.02 0.977(a)
Overall surplus 7.99 3.61 12.66 0.90 1.83 4 1.58 0.390(b)
Primary structural surplus 2.42 3.99 9.13 6.28 0.30 2 1.56 0.555(a)
Cyclical surplus 0.04 0.60 1.21 1.21 3.68a 1 3.18a 0.191
The UK
Primary surplus 0.15 2.41 5.71 4.91 3.15a 2 2.15 0.159
Debt 34.57 11.73 14.96 64.47 3.48a 3 1.81 0.439(b)
Overall surplus 2.48 2.40 7.91 2.61 3.04a 2 2.04 0.201
Primary structural surplus 0.56 2.26 4.02 5.33 2.66a 1 2.22 0.115
Cyclical surplus 0.40 1.34 3.61 2.24 3.67a 1 2.85a 0.094
Note: ratio over GDP, percentage point. Sample period 1963–2001.
SP: Schmidt–Phillips t-statistics.
KPSS: Kwiatkowski et al. (1992) statistic assuming no trend under the null.
L: Lag length for ADF test selected according to AIC.
For SP and KPSS test, lag truncation parameter was set to 3 following the rule l4 = int[4(T/100)1/4] mentioned in
Kwiatkowski et al. (1992).
(a) and (b) indicate rejection at the 5% and 10% level of stationarity by the KPSS test.
a Indicate rejection of the unit-root hypothesis at the 10% critical level for ADF and SP tests.
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constraint.
Data for France, Germany and Italy, contrary to the US case and, to a lesser extent,
the UK’s, do not show a dramatic reversal in the evolution of the public debt to GDP
ratio: the ratio has only stopped increasing at the end of the Nineties. Peaks and troughs
as regards the public deﬁcits have also generally been more spaced in time than in the
US. Adopting a FTPL view, the steep rise in public debt to GDP ratios in France,
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surpluses. It would mean that the convergence path, following the adoption of the
Maastricht Treaty, and the limitations on public deﬁcit incorporated in the SGP would
have changed the expectations on future ﬁscal policies. Indeed, ﬁscal data for these three
countries clearly show that the primary balance has been in surplus since 1996: this could
be analyzed as a discretionary way to satisfy the government present value budget
constraint.
3.1. Baseline approach: A bivariate VAR
Unlike the literature on the sustainability of public ﬁnances, which has been discussed
at length since Hamilton and Flavin (1986), the FTPL does not consider the present-value
budget constraint as a constraint but, rather, as an equilibrium condition.6 Nevertheless,
observing that (4) is satisﬁed does not permit to discriminate between ‘‘Ricardian’’ and
‘‘non-Ricardian’’ regimes for both regimes accept this equation as an equilibrium condi-
tion. For this reason, empirical tests of government sustainability are of no help as indirect
tests for rejecting a ‘‘non-Ricardian’’ regime. Diﬀerently stated, the rejection of sustain-
ability in a FTPL framework should be interpreted as a statistical problem, reﬂecting more
on the test than on the theory itself.7
We thus follow the approach proposed by CCD, which focuses on the IRFs of a
bivariate, unrestricted VAR-in-level, for surplus and debt expressed as percent of
GDP. The VAR-in-level approach provides some robustness with respect to potential
non-stationarity of the data and provides consistent estimates of IRFs. The motivation
for focusing on response functions is in testing the FTPL hypothesis vs. a ‘‘Ricardian’’
regime hypothesis. Both hypotheses convey the same prediction in terms of long-run
properties of debt and surplus.8 To discriminate between both, we have to focus on
the short-run properties of the system, as provided by the IRFs, rather than on long-
run properties. Under the ‘‘non-Ricardian’’ regime, the government surplus is an exoge-
nous forcing process (which may be either stationary or non-stationary). Given that
surplus shocks are plausibly autocorrelated, and that in a ‘‘non-Ricardian’’ set-up the6 The theoretical controversy between Cochrane (2003) and Buiter (2002) as regards the ability of a government
to violate its present value budget constraint is beyond the scope of this paper.
7 Empirical tests of government solvency or sustainability (typically relying on tests of either the stationarity of
the overall deﬁcit, or the cointegration of debt and surplus) have provided various results, with a tendency to
reject sustainability (see e.g. Roberds, 1991, for the US, and Jondeau, 1992, for France). The results of unit-root
tests for the ﬁve countries under study are reported in Table 1. Using ADF procedures, the unit-root hypothesis
can be rejected for the French primary surplus and for all UK ﬁscal data. These results are not robust to a change
in the procedure, except for debt in the UK. Adopting a Schmidt–Phillips procedure, the unit-root hypothesis can
only be rejected at the 10% level for German overall and primary surpluses. For all other countries, the non-
stationarity of the interest-inclusive surplus cannot be rejected, which points to unsustainability. The application
of KPSS tests (without trend) also provide contrasted results. Finally, Italian ﬁscal data prove non-stationary
whatever the adopted procedure.
8 Note that, as pointed by Roberds (1991), stochastic singularity may arise in these bivariate models which
assume a present value budget balance to hold. However, stochastic singularity is avoided here, as in Roberds
(1991), by assuming ex ante (not ex post) constant interest rate, and by allowing the surplus to Granger-cause
debt.
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to be positive in this regime.
3.2. Using cyclical and structural balance dynamics
In a second step, we introduce structural balance data in order to assess whether the
ﬁrst VAR results can be given an FTPL interpretation according to Cochrane’s ‘‘observa-
tional equivalence’’ argument. A ﬁrst test consists in estimating whether structural and
cyclical balance innovations are negatively correlated. This has been showed to be required
in Cochrane’s above example. CCD veriﬁed that the innovations in US structural and
cyclical components were uncorrelated and they concluded that a ‘‘non-Ricardian’’ regime
could be rejected on grounds of Cochrane’s critique. We will apply the same methodology
to European data.
However, this test is quite rough since it relies only upon the contemporaneous corre-
lation between structural and cyclical balance innovations. Extending it to lagged cross-
correlations between these two series led us to consider a non-diagonal, hence more
general than above, A matrix. Assume, as in Cochrane’s example above, that:
X t ¼ AX t1 þ et;
but now with:
A ¼ a11 a12
a21 a22
 
;
Xt follows a VAR rather than two AR processes. If a ‘‘non-Ricardian’’ (FTPL) regime still
holds, bt ¼
Pk
j¼1b
jEtstþj ¼
Pk
j¼1b
jEtðatþj þ ztþjÞ. Using Et(at+k + zt+k) = eAkXt, the
instantaneous impact on real debt of a shock to the cyclical balance can be written as
bFTPL ¼ ebAðI  bAÞ1  P  e01; ð14Þ
where e = (1,1), e1 = (1,0) and P is the Cholesky decomposition of R, the covariance ma-
trix of eat and ezt. Matrix P is thus lower triangular (i.e., shocks are recursively ordered so
that a shock on a may have an impact on z but the reverse is not true, in accordance with
Cochrane’s logic). If A is diagonal, formula (14) provides the same short-run impulse re-
sponse as (12).9
Depending on the coeﬃcients in matrices A and P, bFTPL may be negative. Most
noteworthy, even with uncorrelated contemporaneous innovations, the dynamic interac-
tions between the cyclical and the structural components might produce a negative
response of real debt after a positive surplus shock, even in a FTPL framework. Thus,
the FTPL cannot be rejected solely on grounds of a negative response of public debt to a
positive surplus shock. In the following, we will thus provide a systematic investigation
on the possible feature of an ‘‘observational equivalence’’ making full use of the value
for bFTPL which is implied by the bivariate VAR including structural and cyclical
balances.9 When the VAR includes more than one lag, we implement a generalization of formula (14) using a companion
matrix.
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4.1. A bivariate surplus-debt VAR
The bivariate surplus-debt VAR model has been estimated over the period 1963–2001
respectively for the ﬁve countries under study.10 Estimation results and IRFs are reported
respectively in Table 2 and Fig. 2. The surplus has been ordered ﬁrst. This ordering allows
for a contemporaneous eﬀect of the shock on public debt/GDP, consistently with the exis-
tence of a ‘‘non-Ricardian’’ regime.
In the US case, our results only replicate CCD on a diﬀerent time span (they used a
1951–1995 sample). Like them, we ﬁnd that a 2-lag VAR is needed to ﬁt the data.11 IRFs
are also very similar to those obtained by CCD. A positive shock on the surplus provokes
an immediate decrease in public debt.
For Euro area countries, 1-lag VARs have been estimated. The features of the IRFs are
very similar to those obtained in the US. Conﬁdence intervals indicate that the falls in pub-
lic debt/GDP are statistically signiﬁcant, except after 4 years in the case of Italy.12 These
patterns are consistent with a ‘‘Ricardian’’ interpretation: favourable ﬁscal shocks help to
reduce government debt.
The UK case deserves peculiar attention: within a 2-lag VAR, IRFs exhibit a positive –
though non-signiﬁcant – response of public debt/GDP. This suggests further investiga-
tion as regards the possible existence of a ‘‘non-Ricardian’’ regime in the UK. Further-
more, Fig. 2 indicates that after some time the response of surplus to a surplus shock
eventually becomes negative for several countries (most visibly the US and Germany).
This implies that following a positive surplus shock, the present value of future surpluses
might decrease. In such a case, the negative response of debt found in the IRF could
then be consistent with the FTPL, as in Cochrane’s analysis. Further investigation is
thus worthwhile, although the medium term negative response of the surplus are not
signiﬁcant.
4.2. Incorporating structural balance data
The second step of the analysis has consisted in incorporating the cyclical and cyclically
adjusted primary balance data into the analysis.
4.2.1. The structural and cyclical balances as AR processes
First, the structural and cyclical balances have been modelled as AR processes. Results
are reported in Table 3.
In the case of the US, Germany, France and Italy, an AR(1) model appears as a par-
simonious representation for the structural primary surplus. The autoregressive term
ranges from 0.66 for France to 0.97 for Italy. Two lags are necessary for the UK primary10 While series were available on a longer time span in the US case, the sample period has been chosen so as to be
similar for all countries.
11 Five tests have been performed: LR test, ﬁnal prediction error test, Akaike, Schwarz and Hannah–Quinn
information criterion tests. These ﬁve tests gave consistent results respectively for the ﬁve countries.
12 Note that conﬁdence intervals over a long horizon should be regarded with caution under the assumption of
non-stationarity.
Table 2
VAR estimates ‘‘primary surplus-debt’’
The US Germany France Italy The UK
st bt st bt st bt st bt st bt
st1 0.48 0.61 0.41 0.47 0.67 1.10 0.75 0.21 1.07 0.81
0.29 0.43 0.14 0.26 0.14 0.43 0.09 0.23 0.15 0.76
st2 0.06 0.34 0.45 0.27
0.18 0.26 0.16 0.77
bt1 0.13 1.87 0.03 1.02 0.01 1.00 0.04 0.99 0.03 0.93
0.18 0.26 0.01 0.02 0.01 0.03 0.01 0.03 0.04 0.18
bt2 0.20 0.96 0.08 0.05
0.19 0.28 0.04 0.18
Constant 2.69 3.07 0.73 0.98 0.07 1.37 3.13 2.16 1.41 3.97
1.01 1.49 0.27 0.50 0.18 0.58 0.99 2.58 0.74 3.68
Adj. R-squared 0.65 0.96 0.48 0.99 0.38 0.97 0.86 0.98 0.73 0.70
s.e. equation 1.08 1.60 1.18 2.19 0.84 2.68 1.53 3.98 1.30 6.43
AIC 3.11 3.90 3.25 4.48 2.56 4.89 3.76 5.68 3.49 6.69
SC 3.32 4.11 3.37 4.61 2.68 5.01 3.89 5.81 3.70 6.90
System
Residual
correlation
0.88 0.58 0.46 0.34 0.22
Log likelihood 98.17 132.57 122.62 152.72 141.20
AIC 5.55 7.29 7.35 9.34 8.64
SC 5.97 7.55 7.62 9.61 9.08
Note: st primary surplus, bt debt (both in percentage of GDP), standard errors are in italics, Sample period 1963–
2001.
J. Creel, H. Le Bihan / Journal of Macroeconomics 28 (2006) 338–360 351structural surplus. The cyclical balances are modelled either as an AR(1) model in the
US and Italian cases, or as an AR(2) model in the cases of Germany, France and the
UK.
Signiﬁcant ﬁndings are threefold. First, in the cases of Germany and the UK, the cycli-
cally adjusted primary surplus displays more persistence than the cyclical surplus, which is
consistent with Cochrane’s assumption. Moreover, the correlation coeﬃcients between the
innovations in both components of the primary surplus are respectively and signiﬁcantly
negative (correlation coeﬃcients are q = 0.3 and 0.4). Both elements – persistence and
negative correlation – pave the way for an FTPL interpretation of the surplus-debt to
GDP preliminary model.
Second, despite higher persistence of the Italian structural balance in comparison with
the cyclical one, the innovations for the two AR processes appear to be uncorrelated (cor-
relation coeﬃcient is q = 0.03).
Third, contrary to the intuition as well as to the results reported in CCD for the US
case, the cyclical balance is more persistent than the structural balance in France and in
the US. Furthermore, the innovations for the two AR processes appear to be uncorrelated.
This latter outcome is consistent with the analysis performed by CCD on the US: they con-
cluded that the correlation coeﬃcient between both innovations was equal to 0.06; our
result rather points to a mere 0.02. Higher persistence for the cyclical balance associated
with the absence of correlation between innovations in the two components of the primary
surplus points against an FTPL interpretation of the data.
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Fig. 2. Impulse response functions to a surplus shock.
352 J. Creel, H. Le Bihan / Journal of Macroeconomics 28 (2006) 338–360At this stage, only German and UK ﬁscal data are able to be given an FTPL interpre-
tation. France and Italy would be in a ‘‘Ricardian’’ regime. Similarly to the US case, this
conclusion for the two latter European countries stems from a thorough analysis of ﬁscal
dynamics, mixing CCD’s and Cochrane’s methodologies.
4.2.2. VAR dynamics for cyclical and structural primary balances
In light of the normative example given in Section 3.2 above, we have investigated the
relevance of Cochrane’s ‘‘observational equivalence’’ argument in two steps. First, we
have estimated a VAR with the cyclical and the structural balances. Second, we have
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Fig. 2 (continued)
J. Creel, H. Le Bihan / Journal of Macroeconomics 28 (2006) 338–360 353computed the change in the value of debt after a shock to the cyclical surplus, assuming
that the FTPL hypothesis holds (the ordering for the VAR has been such that the cyclical
surplus has come ﬁrst). This computation relies on the aforementioned present-value for-
mula (14). Recall that if bFTPL is negative, a ‘‘Cochrane eﬀect’’ is present and the FTPL
cannot be rejected on the grounds that the contemporaneous innovations in the cyclical
and structural components of the primary surplus are uncorrelated. In the computation,
b has been set equal to 0.98, which is consistent with an interpretation of this parameter
as one minus a growth-corrected interest rate.
VAR results are reported in Table 4. A 1-lag VAR has been performed for all countries,
except for the UK for which two lags have proven necessary.13 For the US and Italy, the
correlation between innovations eat and ezt is not signiﬁcant (qUS = 0.01 and qItaly = 0.03),
implying that the ordering of shocks is of low importance. In the US case, the lagged cycli-
cal surplus appears with a positive sign in the structural surplus equation. As a result,
introducing structural surplus into the analysis does not help to create long-run negative
autocorrelation in the overall surplus. Assuming a ‘‘non-Ricardian’’ regime, we ﬁnd bFTPL
to be equal to 3.42, so that the FTPL should be manifest in the IRFs; but this is not the
case, indeed. In the Italian case, the value for bFTPL is even higher (28.4). The parameter13 The VAR lag order selection has given rise to mixed results, except for France and Italy where the ﬁve tests
reported in footnote 11 have led to the same result. For the other countries, we have favored the lag chosen by a
majority of the ﬁve tests performed. In every case, the conclusion of the LR test procedure has been endorsed.
Table 3
AR processes for cyclical and primary structural surpluses
The US Germany France Italy The UK
Dependent variable: zt
Constant 0.19 0.08 0.18 0.09 0.23
0.15 0.18 0.13 0.29 0.26
zt1 0.76 0.84 0.66 0.97 0.91
0.12 0.09 0.13 0.06 0.16
zt2 0.27
0.16
s.e. 0.84 1.06 0.71 1.57 1.56
DW 1.83 1.93 1.87 2.23 1.91
AIC 2.55 3.01 2.22 3.79 3.80
SC 2.63 3.10 2.30 3.87 3.93
Dependent variable: at
Constant 0.10 0.00 0.06 0.03 0.15
0.14 0.11 0.06 0.09 0.15
at1 0.79 0.94 1.07 0.46 0.99
0.10 0.16 0.16 0.15 0.15
at2 0.37 0.37 0.43
0.16 0.16 0.15
s.e. 0.77 0.69 0.35 0.55 0.87
DW 1.72 1.86 2.06 1.69 2.01
AIC 2.36 2.18 0.84 1.68 2.64
SC 2.44 2.31 0.97 1.77 2.77
Corr. of innovations at,zt 0.02 0.28 0.07 0.03 0.42
Note: at cyclical surplus, zt primary structural surplus (both in percentage of GDP). Standard errors are in italics.
Sample period 1963–2001.
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that the UK has not been in a ‘‘non-Ricardian’’ regime.
For France and Germany, the lagged cyclical surplus appears with a negative sign in the
cyclically adjusted primary surplus equation, and bFTPL is negative. At face value, this
result indicates that we may observe a ‘‘Ricardian’’ IRF even if a ‘‘non-Ricardian’’ regime
prevails. At least in the case of France, this is quite surprising in light of the results of pre-
vious tests which did not conclude in favor of an FTPL interpretation of ﬁscal data. More-
over, the value obtained for bFTPL for these two countries are very low in absolute terms,
suggesting that an FTPL interpretation of the data is fragile.
On the whole, the actual structural–cyclical balance dynamics provides low support to a
FTPL interpretation of the surplus-debt IRFs for the major industrial countries consid-
ered here. One must yet acknowledge that the use of structural balance data is not able
to refute Cochrane’s claim that one cannot formally test for the prevailing ﬁscal regime.
In the vein of Cochrane’s equivalence argument, one could probably construct other the-
oretical examples in which bFTPL is positive while the FTPL prevails. Moreover, the struc-
tural data compiled in the present paper as well as the CBO data used by CCD (2001) do
not necessarily coincide with Cochrane’s notion of cyclical and structural deﬁcits.1414 Following Cochrane (1998)’s theoretical example, the deﬁcit has a component set by ﬁscal policy (the
structural component) and a component not set at all by ﬁscal policy. The structural component would thus be
the ‘‘pure discretionary ﬁscal stance’’ whose empirical assessment remains unfortunately controversial.
Table 4
VAR estimates ‘‘cyclical surplus–primary structural surplus’’
The US Germany France Italy The UK
at zt at zt at zt at zt at zt
Dependent variable
at1 0.81 0.22 0.65 0.47 0.80 0.46 0.39 0.05 0.96 0.49
0.10 0.11 0.15 0.21 0.10 0.19 0.15 0.45 0.16 0.29
at2 0.37 0.42
0.16 0.29
zt1 0.15 0.74 0.04 0.69 0.13 0.63 0.04 0.97 0.01 1.03
0.11 0.11 0.08 0.11 0.06 0.12 0.02 0.07 0.10 0.17
zt2 0.11 0.39
0.10 0.17
Constant 0.01 0.34 0.03 0.16 0.08 0.10 0.11 0.09 0.21 0.25
0.15 0.16 0.13 0.17 0.07 0.13 0.10 0.30 0.15 0.27
Adj. R-squared 0.62 0.55 0.46 0.72 0.62 0.48 0.23 0.86 0.56 0.54
s.e. 0.76 0.81 0.74 1.01 0.36 0.67 0.53 1.59 0.87 1.54
AIC 2.36 2.49 2.32 2.93 0.87 2.11 1.66 3.84 2.67 3.82
SC 2.49 2.61 2.45 3.06 1.00 2.24 1.79 3.97 2.88 4.03
System
Residual correlation 0.01 0.32 0.16 0.03 0.44
bFTPL 3.42 0.32 0.39 28.40 3.45
Log likelihood 88.47 92.39 47.91 90.24 109.00
AIC 4.84 5.18 3.08 5.50 6.26
SC 5.10 5.44 3.35 5.77 6.69
Note: at cyclical surplus, zt primary structural surplus (both in percentage of GDP). Standard errors are in italics.
Sample period 1963–2001.
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European ﬁscal data seems rather implausible.
4.2.3. Robustness analysis: A three-variable VAR
Last, we have estimated a VAR including the public debt, the cyclical and the structural
balance, in percentage of GDP. This VAR is an unrestricted version of CCD’s test as well
as an unrestricted version of the tests performed and presented above: here, a FTPL
(‘‘non-Ricardian’’) regime is not assumed and what we have rather investigated has been
the dynamic properties on debt of a shock on the primary surplus. IRFs are reported for
shocks to the two components of the overall primary surplus in Fig. 3.
A 1-lag VAR has been estimated in the cases of Germany, France and Italy; whereas, in
the US and UK cases, two lags have been necessary. Results are threefold. First, for the
US, the UK and France, estimation results for the VAR process are such that public debt
is never a signiﬁcant determinant for either the cyclical or the structural component of the
primary surplus. In these countries, this may somewhat dampen the resort to feedback
policy rules to invalidate the FTPL. Second, after a positive shock to either the cyclical
or the structural surplus, the public debt to GDP ratio falls in all countries, except the
UK. As in Section 4.1, the IRFs turn out to have a more plausible interpretation in a
‘‘Ricardian’’ set-up than in a FTPL world. Last, the UK can be singularized here again:
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Fig. 3. Impulse responses of debt to structural and cyclical surplus shocks (three-variable VAR).
356 J. Creel, H. Le Bihan / Journal of Macroeconomics 28 (2006) 338–360a positive shock on the cyclically adjusted primary surplus immediately and signiﬁcantly
raises the public debt to GDP ratio. This response proves insigniﬁcant right afterwards.
All in all, though results are mixed as regards the UK economy, the lack of robustness
of the IRFs, coupled with a high and signiﬁcant parameter value for bFTPL gives argu-
ments for rejecting an FTPL interpretation of ﬁscal data in this country as well.
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Fig. 3 (continued)
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In this paper, we have investigated the relationship between public debts and deﬁcits
with a concern for the ﬁscal theory of the price level. More speciﬁcally, we have questioned
the empirical plausibility of the FTPL in the major European countries and in the USA.
Much attention has been given to the ‘‘observational equivalence’’ argument developed by
Cochrane (1998). The argument states that a negative response of public debt to GDP
ratio after a positive shock on the primary surplus can be observed even in a so-called
‘‘non-Ricardian’’ regime (or FTPL regime).
Our results show that the impulse response functions of a VAR model, either a two- or
a three-variable VAR, either with the primary surplus or with its two separate components
(cyclical and structural), are generally consistent with the benchmark ‘‘Ricardian’’ results
obtained by Canzoneri et al. (2001). The FTPL hypothesis should thus be viewed as non-
plausible for the ﬁve countries under study. Furthermore, taking into account Cochrane’s
critique through the introduction of cyclical and structural primary surplus dynamics does
not allow to provide a FTPL interpretation to previous results.
This study has focused only on ﬁscal data and is subject to several limitations. Among
them, we acknowledge that the analysis has been conducted under the assumption of a
constant expected discount rate. Allowing for a time-varying discount rate would improve
358 J. Creel, H. Le Bihan / Journal of Macroeconomics 28 (2006) 338–360the analysis and might possibly restore the prospect for an FTPL interpretation of the
data.
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Appendix A. Data
The annual data set covers the sample 1963–2001. The data set has been limited to this
time span for comparison purposes due to the unavailability of some data, most notably in
the cases of France and the UK.
All US series have been taken from the Congressional Budget Oﬃce (CBO), The Budget
and Economic Outlook: ﬁscal years 2001–2010, Report to the Senate and House Commit-
tees on the budget, January 2000. The following data: deﬁcit/surplus, cyclically adjusted
deﬁcit/surplus, debt held by the public, actual and potential GDP have all been taken from
table E1 p. 135. Data for the output gap are our own calculations based upon the series of
actual and potential GDP. Net interest have been taken from table E8 p. 142. Primary def-
icit/surplus (primary cyclically adjusted deﬁcit/surplus) data are our own calculations, i.e.
the sum of deﬁcit/surplus (respectively cyclically adjusted deﬁcit/surplus) and net interest.
This method has also held for the European countries under study. Debt held by the public
is federal debt held by non-federal investors, including the federal reserve system.
For France, the main data source has been the OECD. However, long series for net
interest was not available so that, over the period 1970–1999, we have used various issues
of Annuaire Statistique de la France published by the INSEE (national institute for sta-
tistics). Prior to this period, data have been taken from table (pp. 237–239) of Le Mouve-
ment Economique en France 1949–1979, INSEE, se´ries longues statistiques, published in
May 1981.
Data source for Germany and Italy has been the OECD.
The data sources for the UK have been twofold: ONS (Oﬃce of National Statistics) and
OECD. To facilitate comparison with other European countries, OECD data have been
used as benchmark data. Availability has been the following: data begin in 1970, 1978,
1987, respectively for, ﬁrst, net public debt, second, deﬁcit/surplus and primary deﬁcit/sur-
plus, and third, cyclically adjusted deﬁcit/surplus and cyclically adjusted primary deﬁcit/
surplus. ONS data have been used to backcast ﬁscal data.The deﬁcit/surplus has been
backcasted using general government net lending/net borrowing at current prices (series
BBNNBK, Blue Book (BB02), table number: 1.7.7). The net public debt has been back-
casted using levels of general government net ﬁnancial assets/liabilities (series BBNYOG,
Blue Book (BB02), table number: 1.7.9). Net interest are equal to interest paid by the gen-
eral government (series NRKB, UK national statistics online) minus total property
income received by the general government (series NMYL, UK national statistics online).
We last discuss more in details two speciﬁc data issues: debt and the output gap.
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net debt held by the public excluding base money. Excluding base money from net total
liabilities is consistent with Hamilton and Flavin (1986) treatment of public debt. They
notably exclude base money from ‘‘oﬃcially reported debt’’ (p. 812) and use the resulting
‘‘corrected debt’’ to test for the sustainability of ﬁscal policy, via the present value budget
constraint (PVBC). By contrast, the FTPL asks how the PVBC is satisﬁed in equilibrium.
Whatever the type of tests on the PVBC, be it related to the sustainability literature or to
the FTPL, and whatever the interpretation of the results, using net public debt is crucial
and in addition, excluding base money is in our view appropriate. It is not uncontroversial
however, since Canzoneri et al. (2001) add base money to net federal debt (p. 1127).
The motivation for our choice has been twofold. First, the latest versions of the FTPL
point to the uselessness of ﬁat money as a means of transaction, from the ‘‘cashless limit’’
case of Woodford (1997) – the money balances held to facilitate transactions become neg-
ligible, to the ‘‘cashless world’’ of Christiano and Fitzgerald (2000) which replicated the
model ‘‘without money’’ by Sims (1994). We acknowledge that the original version of
the FTPL states that the distinction between interest paying government bonds and
non-interest bearing transactions money is irrelevant for price level determination, so that
the measure of public liabilities in the PVBC should have had to be inclusive, rather than
exclusive, of base money (see Woodford, 1995, or the early contributions by Sims). How-
ever, in including base money in the measure of public liabilities, analyses like that of CCD
tend to mix up the FTPL with the Quantity theory,15 though the former stems from the
analytical rejection of the latter.
Second, and maybe more importantly, in including base money in public liabilities, one
implicitly assumes that the central bank is not independent from the ﬁscal authority and
that base money participates in the ﬁnancing of public deﬁcits. However, it has been a long
time now since money creation and seigniorage have intervened substantially in the ﬁnanc-
ing of public deﬁcits within the countries under study, except maybe in Italy (see Buiter,
1990).
Finally, we have checked that the IRFs of our surplus-debt VAR for the US were sim-
ilar to those obtained by CCD (2001) over the same time span (1951–1995). This indicates
that, at least in the US case, results are fully robust to including or not including base
money in public liabilities.
As regards the output gap, we generally have had diﬃculties ﬁnding long series for the
European countries’ output gap. The output gap is available in the OECD data only pos-
terior to 1964, 1967, 1974 and 1987, respectively for Italy, Germany, France and the UK.
We have thus backcasted the available output gap data using the HP ﬁlter applied to GDP
at constant prices. This method has provided a good approximation to the OECD indica-
tor over the most recent period. To compute a structural balance between 1963 and the
last year for which data were unavailable, we have used elasticities of 0.31, 0.44, 0.32
and 0.49 of the cyclical balance with respect to the output gap, respectively for Italy, Ger-
many, France and the UK. These elasticities were obtained from a linear regression of
total government balance on structural balance and the output gap over the available
sample.15 Including base money in the net liabilities of the government, there is still scope for price and inﬂation
determination to be exclusively a monetary phenomenon, i.e. what the Quantity theory conveys as a major
conclusion.
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